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Linguistics and the law 
Abstract 
This chapter is an introduction to the diverse and growing field of language and law. It provides an 
overview of the key areas in the field, organised under two broad banners: the language of the legal 
process, and the role of linguistic analysis as part of that process. The first part considers the analysis 
of texts such as legal documents, police interviews and courtroom interaction. The second part 
focuses on the increasing use of linguists as expert witnesses, where linguistic analysis is presented 
as evidence in areas such as authorship analysis, language crimes, and trademarks. 
As a whole, the chapter illuminates the pivotal role that language plays in the functioning of the legal 
system, while also highlighting the many ways in which the justice process ironically perpetuates 
injustice through language. It thereby demonstrates the important contribution which linguists can 
make through critical analysis of – and engagement with – the legal system. 
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Introduction  
‘Our law is a law of words… Morality or custom may be embedded in human behavior, but law – 
virtually by definition – comes into being through language… Few professions are as dependent 
upon language.’ Tiersma 1999: 1 
From the magna carta to a marriage certificate, few texts are as influential over our daily lives as 
those generated by the legal world. By the same token, as highlighted by Tiersma, there are few 
institutions which operate so completely through the medium of language. The relationship 
between language and law is thus an intrinsic and important one.  
Although ‘applied linguistics’ originally tended to refer only to applications relating to language 
learning, it increasingly involves applying the theories and findings of linguistic research to far more 
diverse areas, such as medicine, business, the media, and many others. Given both the significant 
role of language and the enormously high stakes involved, legal contexts offer the linguist 
considerable opportunity for truly meaningful ‘real world’ applications for their research. Yet the 
challenges involved in gaining access to and conducting research on what is often extremely 
sensitive and well-protected personal data, mean that this is an area of applied linguistics which has 
yet to reach the peak of its potential.  
Readers may already be familiar with the term ‘forensic linguistics’. Linguists take great interest in 
the labels used to define concepts; lawyers like nothing more than arguing over definitions and 
scope. It is therefore no surprise that there is no firm agreement as to what ‘forensic linguistics’ 
actually covers. The term is used in a general sense to refer to any interface between language and 
law, thus including analysis of the language used within the legal system; the more widely accepted, 
and arguably more accurate, meaning is the use of linguistic evidence in the judicial process, usually 
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in the form of expert evidence from a linguist. Definitions aside, this brings out a useful distinction 
between the two main strands of the academic field of language and law: analysis (and usually 
critique) of the language of the legal process, and linguists as part of the legal process. This chapter 
is organised under those two broad banners, although inevitably there are areas of overlap. It should 
also be mentioned that there is a related, thriving, field of forensic phonetics, but this falls beyond 
the scope of this chapter. 
In keeping with the field’s ‘applied’ agenda, the work described in this chapter has no unifying 
methodology; much of the research has adopted the ‘toolkit’ approach of utilising an analytic 
approach, or combination of approaches, which is best suited to producing specific, ‘real world’ 
answers to perceived problems or challenges. However, that is not to say that there is not a keen 
interest in developing and maintaining methodological rigour; indeed this is a key site of activity in 
forensic linguistics in order to ensure that any linguistic evidence provided is of the utmost validity 
and reliability, not least so that it will meet the increasingly stringent tests being applied to the 
admissibility of expert witness evidence in court. 
One unifying factor, however, is that much of the work in forensic linguistics has taken a critical 
stance, seeking to highlight instances of disadvantage and injustice. This has taken many forms, from 
revealing miscarriages of justice where police officers had falsified written documents used to 
support a prosecution (e.g. the Bentley case, reported in Coulthard 2002), to demonstrating the 
comprehension challenges of texts such as warning labels and jury instructions. An area which is 
gaining increasing prominence is critiquing current practice in using language analysis to determine 
national origin (LADO), especially in immigration and asylum contexts. It is worth emphasising that 
the intention behind the vast majority of research in this field is to inform and enhance current 
practice, by engaging with (rather than simply directing external criticism at) practitioners.  
The majority of published research to date has focused on the legal systems of the UK, US and 
Australia, but is by no means limited to these jurisdictions. Research is being conducted in many 
other countries all over the world, and although there is as yet little in the way of systematic 
comparative analysis, it seems clear that the intrinsic link between language and law, and the 
tensions and communicative challenges which arise, are universal. 
 
The language of the legal process 
This section describes the key areas of interest for those studying the language used by and within 
the legal system. It is not an exhaustive list, and it only provides a brief overview of each topic, but 
hopefully this will serve to illustrate the many ways in which linguistic analysis can explicate and 
inform the legal processes and frameworks that govern our lives.  
Legal language 
Legal language permeates our lives, even if we are often blissfully unaware of this. Written legal 
texts of one sort or another in fact govern virtually everything we do. To take an average day, it 
might begin with the sound of your alarm clock going off. The power which supplies your alarm clock 
comes from an energy company, with whom you will have entered into a written contract governing 
the terms of the supply. Despite our day-to-day reliance on the company upholding its end of this 
contract, you probably haven’t given its existence any thought, especially not at this time in the 
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morning. But the alarm has gone off because you have to get up. This may be because you are 
employed, in which case you will have signed a contract which determines that you have a duty to 
work today. Or perhaps you are a student (in which case the alarm is probably set a little later). You 
will be bound by a contract with your educational institution, which likely enables it to impose 
penalties if you do not fulfil certain requirements, such as attendance. These obligations interfere 
with our overwhelming desire to stay in bed longer, and so perhaps we need to set up our alarm to 
be extremely loud. However, depending on where you live you may well be in breach of local bye-
laws, or even legislation, governing noise nuisance. As our morning continues we might glance at the 
warning label on the back of the bottle whilst we rely on our contract with the water company to 
keep the supply running long enough to rinse the shampoo out, take a chance on the fact that our 
peanut butter ‘may contain nuts’, travel by public transport having agreed (through the act of buying 
a ticket) to abide by the terms and conditions, and listen to music or read a book protected by a 
copyright notice (like this one – have a look!). 
If we collected together all these texts, there are likely to be a number of similarities in the language 
used. Linguists (e.g. Crystal & Davy 1969, Tiersma 1999) have identified a number of features of 
what can be described as ‘legal language’, which make it distinct enough to be recognisable as a 
specific ‘genre’ (see chapter 15). These include a very formal register, with a lack of evaluative and 
emotive language; specific lexis or ‘jargon’, such as ‘reasonable grounds’; archaisms such as 
‘aforementioned’, ‘hereinbefore’;  the use of the present and future tense1, e.g. ‘this book is sold’, 
‘the replaced Product shall be warranted’; precision, such as ‘ninety (90) days’, and the inclusion of 
definition sections; binomial and multinomial expressions, e.g. ‘unauthorised or fraudulent use’; 
syntactic complexity and density, such as heavily embedded clause structure and unusual word 
order, e.g. ‘all rights of the producer and the owner of the work reproduced reserved’; and 
orthographic features such as the use of capitalisation, and numbered sections and subsections. Not 
all legal texts will contain all of these features, but the more that occur, the more the text will 
resemble ‘legalese’ and the more typical it will be of the genre.   
It will be immediately obvious that these features are not reader-friendly; indeed they largely 
interfere with, rather than aid, comprehension, and it is easy to criticise texts of this type from a 
linguistic perspective2. Such obscure and complex language designed and perpetuated within one 
profession has led to accusations of exclusivity and even deliberate obfuscation in order to create a 
demand for the services of a lawyer. Although this is unlikely, there is no doubt that legal language, 
like other in-group discourse within specific communities of practice (see chapter 17), serves to mark 
users as members of a particular elite group, inaccessible to the uninitiated. 
However, there are other, more cogent, explanations for the features of this genre. It is, as always, 
essential to take into account the context and function of the texts. As Crystal & Davy note of legal 
language, ‘[o]f all uses of language it is perhaps the least communicative, in that it is designed not so 
much to enlighten language-users at large as to allow one expert to register information for scrutiny 
by another.’ (1969: 193-4).  In other words, we as parties are not necessarily the intended audience 
                                                          
1 Realised in English typically through deontic modality. 
2 However, it is often overlooked that for all the examples of obscure, impenetrable text there are also 
examples of the most powerful language performing remarkable feats through the simplest of speech acts: 
‘There shall be a Scottish parliament’ (Scotland Act 1998); ‘I pronounce you husband and wife’. 
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for the texts that bind us; instead they are written for fellow members of the legal establishment, 
especially the courts whose interpretation would be called upon in the event of any dispute. The 
purpose of all such texts is to create a specific state of affairs, according with all applicable legal 
principles, and it must achieve that without any room for ambiguity, omission or misinterpretation. 
It thus cannot be like ‘ordinary’ day-to-day language, which is known to rely on inference, elision and 
indirectness (chapter 13). It often prefers not to risk even the inferential step contained within a 
pronoun, even when the intended referent would seem obvious, since this still potentially opens up 
an opportunity to argue for a different interpretation. This illustrates the tension between accuracy 
and accessibility which lies at the heart of legal language. For any legally binding text, certainty is 
essential. Legal texts involve the imposition of obligations and the conferment of rights; they are 
therefore constantly under attack from those seeking to avoid their responsibilities or abuse the 
rights of others. The language of the text carries the important responsibility of removing (as far as 
possible) the opportunities to do so. 
Many legal texts, then, are designed to communicate a specific message to other legal professionals, 
and therefore to be understood and interpreted within that professional context. It is in that sense 
perhaps most accurately viewed as a type of technical language. UK primary legislation is drafted 
with the aid of specialist software which is also utilised in the construction of aircraft maintenance 
manuals. To use that analogy, when we board an aeroplane, we don’t expect to be able to 
understand the maintenance manual; what matters to us is that it made sense to the maintenance 
engineer and so the wings aren’t going to drop off. Legislative text ought perhaps to be viewed in 
the same light. 
Although that argument may hold for legislation, it cannot be maintained across all types (or sub-
genres) of legal language. For many legal texts the need for comprehensibility should be given far 
more weight than is currently the case. This is particularly the case for texts whose purpose is 
primarily to communicate with a lay audience, such as, for example, the instructions given to jurors 
on how to reach their verdict (e.g. Heffer 2008) or product warnings (e.g. Dumas 2010). Many such 
texts have been demonstrated by linguists to perform inadequately in terms of communicating their 
message to the intended audience, often with serious consequences. For example, Dumas describes 
a US case in which experts, called in to analyse the adequacy of jury instructions given in a death 
penalty case, concluded that ‘the death sentence was imposed by jurors who did not understand 
their instructions’ (2002: 254). Despite the intended audience and purpose of these text types, they 
have frequently been found to contain highly confusing features such as complex embedded clause 
structure, archaisms, and unexplained jargon. It seems that the producers of all types of legal text 
have a tendency to draw on the conventions of the genre, even when there is little justification for 
so doing.  
The language of the judicial process 
Thus far we have dealt only with written text. A significant proportion of legal text is actually 
produced orally, typically through direct interaction between members of the lay public and the 
legal system. In fact in Common Law jurisdictions such as the US, UK and Australia, most of the 
judicial process, through which the written legal texts discussed above are enforced and upheld, is 
enacted through spoken discourse. This gives rise to a different type of linguistic analysis, although 
the themes of miscommunication and disadvantage remain prevalent.  
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The legal system is an institution with its own unique organisational practices and communicative 
norms. When members of the lay public need to communicate with this institution, interactional 
trouble often ensues. The tension has been usefully explicated through the application of Bruner’s 
concept of paradigmatic (typically legal), versus narrative (typically lay) modes of reasoning, 
especially in the work of Heffer (e.g. 2005). The idea that the legal system operates on the basis of a 
different conceptualisation of what is important or relevant in a telling, and of the most logical 
expected order of the component parts, is an important one, which goes a long way towards 
explaining why communication between a legal institution and members of the general public is 
often less than straightforward. The difficulty for the lay individual is that it is the other party who 
gets to determine and even enforce the interactional ‘rules’, and they also frequently have 
significant power over the outcome of the interaction. 
Initial encounters 
The tensions just outlined are played out in the microcosm of a call to the emergency services. These 
are typically very short texts, but a great deal is accomplished through them. They are thus ideally 
suited to the micro-approach of Conversation Analysis (see e.g. Zimmerman 1992), although by no 
means exclusively. Emergency calls to the police (via 911 in the US, 999 in the UK, and so on) often 
represent the first moment of institutional involvement, where an occurrence of some sort becomes 
transformed into an institutionally recognised and actionable ‘incident’. Not every event reported to 
the police will be actionable, however: one of the most important functions of emergency call-takers 
is to act as gate-keepers, determining which calls merit a police response and which do not. The 
dividing line depends on numerous legal factors such as the limits of police powers, and whether the 
event described involves criminal activity as opposed to being a civil matter. The point at which this 
line is drawn will be known to those within the institution, but will not always be obvious to the lay 
caller. This can lead to a clash between lay expectations and the reality of the process, and 
emergency calls represent the site of that clash. They therefore not only make for fascinating 
linguistic data, but also represent an area of operational practice which could benefit immensely 
from the insights of linguistic research, which has examined features such as overall structure, 
opening turns of both callers and call-takers, strategies for aligning the caller with the institutional 
task in hand (Zimmerman 1992), and the particular complexities of calls about domestic disputes 
(Tracy & Agne 2002). 
Another preliminary context which represents a common site of interactional difficulty, at least for 
the lay participant, is in the communication of rights. Several linguistic studies have highlighted the 
potential injustice caused by the interactional strategies and interpretive norms utilised by 
representatives of the legal process in situations where an individual may wish to invoke a particular 
legal right. This includes the invocation of the right to a legal representative for a police interview in 
the US, where the legal process apparently expects a person in a massively disadvantageous position 
to abandon all communicative norms of indirectness, politeness, and power relations, and to make 
their request for a lawyer in only the most literal and imposing manner. Thus utterances such as ‘I 
think I would like to talk to a lawyer’, and ‘maybe I should talk to a lawyer’ have been held by US 
courts not to be sufficiently clear to amount to an invocation of that right (see Solan & Tiersma 2005: 
54-62 for an accessible discussion). However, Solan & Tiersma (2005: 62) points out that the same 
legal system shows itself to be entirely capable of determining the inferred meaning of far more 
ambiguous requests made by police officers who would otherwise be held to have carried out illegal 
searches.  
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Another notable example is the delivery of the caution in the UK, which is intended to advise 
detainees of essential information about their rights and obligations relating to their questioning. A 
standard text must be performed by the interviewer at the start of every police interview with a 
suspect, but several linguistic studies have demonstrated the communicative challenges created by 
the fixed wording used (e.g. Cotterill 2000; Rock 2007). The caution is a classic example of a text 
whose function is to convey a complex legal provision to a lay audience; an intrinsically challenging 
task. Nevertheless, the application of linguistic research can once again assist in improving current 
practice. 
Police interviews 
One of the most significant sites of spoken interaction in the legal process is the police interview. A 
vital part of any criminal investigation is the interviewing of both witnesses and suspects in order to 
gain as much information as possible about the event(s) in question. These first-hand accounts will 
be key evidence for the investigation, and for any subsequent prosecution.  
To focus on suspect interviews, the functions, formats and processes of police-suspect interview 
discourse make it a highly unusual, and linguistically fascinating, discourse context. There is 
international variance as to the conduct and format of the interview, for example UK suspect 
interviews are mandatorily audio-recorded and then transcribed in Q&A format, whereas in much of 
continental Europe the interview is aimed at producing a written summary of the interaction, 
authored by the police interviewer but sometimes reproduced as an interviewee’s first-person 
monologue. These different institutional purposes and processes produce different types of 
discourse: for example, the interviewer’s synchronous typing of a written statement has been shown 
to directly affect turn-taking in Dutch interviews (van Charldorp 2013); whereas in the UK, interview 
talk must simultaneously be addressed to both those present in the interview room, and the future 
audiences for the audio recording, a discursively challenging task to manage (Haworth 2013). 
Whatever the process of production, the interview record will be an important piece of evidence, 
which is treated by the criminal justice process as resulting from providing the interviewee with an 
open opportunity to put forward their side of the story. Yet any linguist will recognise this not to be 
the case. Alongside the editing and changes which inevitably take place through the recording 
processes just mentioned, there are many discursive factors which will also affect the interviewee’s 
words in the interview itself. Police interview participants are by no means equally matched: aside 
from the very real power that a police interviewer has over the interviewee, the discursive role of 
questioner itself grants the interviewer power over the topic, sequencing and overall structure of 
the interview (see e.g. Heydon 2005). Other linguistic features, available to an interviewer but not an 
interviewee, have also been identified as problematic, such as formulations and restrictive question 
types. The interviewee’s discursive position as responder thus inevitably restricts what they will get 
to say, despite this being ostensibly the main interactional purpose.  
This begs the question as to why a question-answer format is employed; however there are good 
reasons for an interviewer, who has the task of investigating an alleged crime according to a strict 
framework of procedural regulations and prosecution requirements, being enabled to keep the 
discourse legally relevant and institutionally appropriate. It is also essential that a suspect’s account 
is challenged and probed. The discursive challenge lies in balancing this with providing the suspect 
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with a fair chance to speak in their own terms. The linguistic research thus far indicates that the very 
nature of the discourse means that this is frequently not achieved. 
Courtroom language 
If the police interview represents a challenging context for the lay participant, this is even more true 
of the courtroom. In all jurisdictions, courtrooms represent the most significant stage of the judicial 
process, and in Common Law adversarial systems they are also the most dramatic – both in the 
sense of being the culmination of the process, and of involving a large element of performance and 
display3. Cases must be decided solely on the basis of evidence presented orally in the courtroom 
(even physical exhibits must be introduced with an oral statement), and consequently mastery of the 
language is often as important to courtroom advocates as mastery of the relevant law. Lay 
participants, of course, do not benefit from any professional experience or training when put in the 
position of speaking in court; yet again we see that they are placed at the disadvantage of a highly 
restrictive and unfamiliar discursive environment, governed by legal rules which are largely unknown 
to them. 
The significance of linguistic resources in the courtroom is well recognised, as reflected in numerous 
provisions which directly relate to language features, even if they are not expressed in such terms. 
Turn-taking and turn distribution are almost entirely pre-allocated, from the ‘micro’ sense of 
individual turns between lawyer and witness being restricted to question and answer, to the broader 
structure of the order in which each side gets to present its case, to question witnesses, and to make 
speeches. This rigid, and rigorously enforced, structure ensures an equal distribution of speaker 
rights between prosecution and defence, as well as ensuring that the last word always rests with the 
defence. The professional right to speak in a courtroom is itself closely protected: lawyers must earn 
‘rights of audience’ through achieving specialist qualifications, and in some countries the type of 
qualification determines which level of court they may speak in4. There are also rules about the type 
of questions which can be asked at each point: when questioning their own witness, lawyers are not 
permitted to use ‘leading’ questions, for fear of interfering with the witness’s own evidence. 
When it comes to lay participants, witnesses cannot simply give their evidence; they are restricted 
solely to answering the questions put to them by lawyers for each side, and this is enforced 
considerably more strictly than in a police interview. The defendant cannot speak in response to 
anything said by a witness against them; instead they must rely on their lawyer to speak for them, 
only through the format of asking questions, until eventually it becomes their turn to be questioned. 
It is difficult to imagine a communicative context which less resembles our everyday experience. Yet 
the tight control held over the discourse is intended to ensure fairness and adherence to legal 
principles, even if it results in a bewildering and frustrating experience for lay participants. 
Analyses of courtroom language have highlighted the various linguistic strategies utilised by 
courtroom advocates in order to achieve their goals. Adversarial trials ideally require the creation of 
a coherent and persuasive narrative, into which all the evidence fits (or at least does not contradict). 
It is for this reason that lawyers attach so much importance to attempting to direct and restrict the 
                                                          
3 In Civil/Roman Law (inquisitorial) jurisdictions the courtroom trial is based mainly on the consideration of 
written documents, and as such has been subject to considerably less linguistic interest. 
4 In England & Wales, for example, the right to speak in a Crown Court or higher is a badge of professional 
distinction between barristers (who automatically have that right) and solicitors (who do not). 
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evidence given by each witness, both for their own side and the other’s. Their only resource for so 
doing is the questions they ask. The power of a question to shape the answer given has long been 
recognised, and this is turned into something of an art form in court, with every aspect from pauses 
to terms of address and lexical choice exploited for persuasive effect. 
Although controlling the evidence produced in the questioning phase is challenging and 
unpredictable for advocates, they have the opportunity to present a much more structured and 
rehearsed version of events in their monologic opening and closing statements. These lend 
themselves well to narrative analysis (see e.g. Heffer 2005), and also to detailed analysis of the 
subtle linguistic features utilised by advocates to influence the judge and/or jury’s perception of 
events. For example, Cotterill 2003 demonstrates the power of lexical choice in the speeches of the 
O.J. Simpson trial in the US, analysing the semantic prosody of seemingly innocuous terms such as 
‘encounter’ (2003: 65ff). As she points out, ‘[t]hrough skilful exploitation of different layers of lexical 
meaning, it is possible for lawyers to communicate subtle and partisan information about victims 
and alleged perpetrators, without falling foul of the rules of evidence’ (2003: 67). The courtroom, 
then, represents an important site where the interests of lawyers and linguists coincide, albeit 
coming from very different directions. 
Language and disadvantage 
It is apparent that the language of the legal process presents particular communicative challenges to 
those outside the system, which necessarily includes the very citizens it is designed to protect. Thus 
far, however, we have assumed that the lay participant has a ‘standard’ level of communicative 
competence. Yet for a significant proportion of those who find themselves involved in legal 
processes, there are additional factors which render the communicative process even more 
problematic. These are often those who in fact most need the protection of the legal system, such as 
children, speakers of other first languages, and victims of sexual crime. Extra protections are 
increasingly on offer to assist those who can be officially classed as ‘vulnerable’, such as the 
provision of interpreters, the use of specially trained interviewers, and the use of video recordings or 
screens when giving evidence to the court. Yet there is plenty of scope for further improvement, and 
there is a wealth of linguistic knowledge which can assist. Increasing police interviewers’ 
understanding of the role of an interpreter can significantly improve their effectiveness in 
interviews, for example. And Eades’ work on the cross-cultural communicative challenges faced by 
Aboriginals in the Australian legal system (e.g. Eades 2008) has highlighted specific culturally 
dependent features such as ‘gratuitous concurrence’ and the use of silence which are particularly 
likely to lead to misunderstanding and injustice. Eades raises a serious concern for the linguist, 
however: the danger that by increasing awareness of potential linguistic vulnerabilities, we simply 
provide the cross-examining lawyer with an extra weapon to use against a witness.  This is, of 
course, not a reason not to engage with the legal process: if we have any inclination to be ‘applied’ 
or ‘critical’ in our linguistic research, and to oppose injustice, then what better site of engagement is 
there than the justice process itself? 
Language as evidence  
We now move to a separate and distinct area of linguistics and the law. There are many ways in 
which language itself becomes evidence, both in civil disputes and in criminal proceedings. When 
this occurs, linguists are increasingly being called on as experts to assist with the investigative and 
judicial process. This section outlines some of the key areas where the discipline of linguistics has 
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been utilised as part of the legal process, as opposed to being used as a tool for analysing it. Before 
going into the areas in which linguists have provided evidence, we will begin by considering the role 
of a linguist acting as an expert witness. Since the vast majority of expert linguistic evidence to date 
has been in Common Law jurisdictions (mainly the UK and US), this section will concentrate on the 
position in these countries, however the general principles are likely to be similar elsewhere. 
The linguist as expert witness 
Put simply, the task of a court is to decide between competing versions of events, on the basis of the 
evidence presented to it. The court can only base its decision on what is presented to it in court; 
there are consequently detailed and complex rules governing admissibility. The general principle is 
that only evidence of ‘fact’ is admissible; a person’s ‘opinion’ is not: the only opinion which counts is 
the court’s, and no witness should usurp that function. However, sometimes the court will need help 
in interpreting the ‘facts’ presented to it, for example technical engineering data about a ship which 
sank, or complex medical information. In order to assist with this, an expert can be called. Their task 
is to apply their expertise to the facts which are being presented, and to provide the court with their 
opinion on them. This therefore breaks the fundamental rule about the inadmissibility of opinion 
evidence. Consequently, a huge body of case law and procedural rules has developed around expert 
evidence, in order to police the boundaries of its admissibility. There is no need here to go into the 
complexities of the relevant principles, but it is worth highlighting that one of the main criteria will 
be whether the expert can provide ‘information which is likely to be outside the experience and 
knowledge of a judge or jury’ (R v Turner5, a UK criminal case). The challenge for linguistics, then, is 
to convince courts that our discipline can offer scientific analysis and insight that goes beyond the 
knowledge that judges, as gatekeepers, think they already have about the language they use every 
day. In addition, courts will assess the validity and reliability of the methodology used, applying 
criteria such as whether there are known error rates6. A further concern, then, is developing 
methodologies and analytic frameworks which are robust and valid. This is, of course, essential given 
the use to which such analyses will be put and the hugely significant consequences for those directly 
involved. It also means that the field of forensic linguistics is increasingly at the forefront of 
developing reliable and innovative methodologies, especially for the analysis of short texts such as 
text messages. Thus this most ‘applied’ of linguistic fields has the potential to make major 
theoretical contributions. 
It must also be noted that of the cases in which the advice of a linguistic expert is sought, a majority 
never reach court. They may be settled at an earlier stage, or a prosecution might be dropped, or a 
guilty plea might be entered. Nevertheless, the linguistic evidence may well have played a role in 
that outcome.  
Authorship analysis  
Probably the most well-known type of linguistic evidence is authorship analysis. There are many 
situations in which authorship of a text may become legally relevant: threatening letters; terrorist 
manuals; ransom notes; text messages sent by one person pretending to be another. The linguist’s 
task is to provide analysis which is directed towards establishing the likely author of the disputed 
                                                          
5 R v Turner [1975] 2 WLR 56 (CA) p.60 
6 Included in the criteria set out in the US case of Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.. 509 U.S. 579 
(1993).  
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text. That statement is deliberately hedged: it is not, and never will be, possible to identify a specific 
individual simply from a sample of their language use; any individual’s linguistic repertoire is too 
variable and vast for a ‘linguistic fingerprint’ to exist. Instead, a linguist will take the disputed text(s), 
and compile a referential sample of (preferably similar) texts produced by a potential author for 
comparison. The key to authorship analysis is in finding features which are distinctive within a 
known author’s data, and which can therefore be used as identifying markers, and then in revealing 
patterns of consistency between a known author and the disputed texts. This is a challenging 
enough task in itself, but it is often made more difficult by the small size of the disputed data 
sample. On the other hand, there is often only a limited number of potential suspects. The question 
that a linguist will be trying to answer, then, is which of these is most likely to be the author of the 
disputed text. A related question is whether a text or group of texts has been written by the same 
author. This was the issue in what is widely regarded as the first case of forensic linguistics, that of 
Timothy Evans (Svartvik 1968). Evans was convicted of murder and hanged in 1950. However, 
subsequent evidence cast considerable doubt over his guilt. Many years later, the linguist Jan 
Svartvik noticed inconsistencies in the language of a statement supposedly made by Evans, and 
further analysis revealed that the parts which contained incriminating material were of a different 
style to the rest. This indicated that the statement was not the work of one author; indeed particular 
stylistic features suggested that the incriminating parts were in fact inserted by the police. Svartvik’s 
analysis published in 1968 highlighted the potential contribution that linguistics could make in such 
cases, and is thought to contain the first use of the term ‘forensic linguistics’, thus staking a claim as 
the origin of the field. 
Forensic authorship analysis has moved on considerably since then and is now utilised as part of 
both prosecution and defence evidence – as opposed to simply academic studies like Svartvik’s.  
Recent examples include terrorism offences where linguistic analysis was requested to determine 
whether a suspect was likely to have written certain documents found at his house which related to 
a terrorist plot. There is a significant legal difference between merely having a copy of such a text 
and being responsible for its production, and so establishing a link between these documents and 
texts known to have been written by the suspect is a vital part of this investigation. Other cases 
include murder trials where no body has been found, and text messages have continued to be sent 
from the victim’s phone after their disappearance. It is notoriously difficult to secure a conviction in 
such circumstances, but linguistic analysis has been able to establish that those texts were more 
likely to have been written by the main suspect than the victim, providing compelling supporting 
evidence at trial. 
Modern modes of communication such as text messages and instant messaging present 
methodological challenges to the analyst, not least due to their tendency to be very short. However, 
these innovative, fluctuating data types also produce more idiosyncratic features, since the rules and 
conventions are not yet settled. There is therefore room for wider interpersonal variation, making it 
easier to find features which are distinctive within one writer’s style. Nevertheless, this is an area 
where methodological concerns are at the forefront of current thinking (see e.g. Grant 2010). 
Determination of meaning  
Another key area in which the expertise of a linguist is sought is in the determination of meaning. 
This can take many forms, for example whether the language used by an individual amounts to a 
criminal offence, whether the interpretation provided of a police interview is an acceptable 
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representation of the original, whether a product warning is adequate, or whether the wording of an 
agreement can really cover what a party claims for it. This can often be a challenging task, where 
legal expectation and linguistic knowledge clash. The legal system demands certainty, but linguists 
are well aware that communication is rarely explicit or unambiguous, and meaning is heavily 
context-dependent. There are therefore many ways in which linguistics can inform and improve 
courts’ decision-making in these areas. 
Language crimes  
An area where it is often necessary to determine the meaning of an utterance is in the various 
criminal offences in which language forms the substantive act (known legally as the actus reus). 
These include crimes such as bribery, conspiracy and blackmail. Alongside a specific act (e.g. the 
offering of money), most criminal offences also necessitate establishing the thinking behind the act 
(mens rea). Speaker intention therefore becomes both legally and linguistically relevant. The 
difficulty is that even at the best of times we rarely state our purpose directly; instead we tend to 
convey our meaning through inference and indirectness, rather than by explicit statement. This is 
even more so when there might be a reason to disguise our intentions, such as the fact that they 
amount to a crime. These factors make it very challenging to prove that a person’s words had one 
particular meaning, which is effectively what a court is trying to do in these cases.  
Often the difference between whether an utterance amounts to a language crime or not comes 
down to the type of speech act involved. For example, if a person says to someone at the top of a 
flight of steps ‘be careful, if you slip you’ll hurt yourself’, this might be a threat, but could equally 
plausibly be a warning, or a prediction. However, if the steps are outside a courtroom and the 
addressee is a witness about to give evidence against the speaker’s brother, it is more likely to have 
been taken, and indeed intended, as a threat. The difficulty for the courts, then, is that the 
distinction between these speech acts lies not in the literal words used but in the underlying 
implication generated in the specific context of utterance. To put this in linguistic terms, the part of 
the utterance which is criminally actionable is the perlocutionary intent, not the illocutionary act, yet 
this is never likely to be made explicit. So how far can the courts go from the actual words used 
when convicting someone of a crime? How much inference is legally acceptable? A court needs to be 
sure of the intended meaning if it is to convict the speaker on the strength of it. Equally, it cannot be 
right for those guilty of a serious offence to be able to take advantage of ordinary principles of 
communication in order to escape justice. 
The other side of the coin is that, just as people rarely use literal statement to commit a language 
crime, when people do use words which literally amount to a crime they are highly unlikely to mean 
it. Consider, for example, how commonly verbs such as ‘kill’ are used in a metaphorical sense, to 
mean anything from switching off a light to reprimanding someone (e.g. ‘I’m going to kill him when I 
see him’). Such metaphorical usage is often colloquial, and can vary between sociolinguistic 
communities. Even if we are not part of that speech community, it would seem obvious that the 
speaker’s meaning is not in fact to commit a serious crime, but both historical and recent examples 
illustrate the preference for law enforcers to ignore pragmatics and sociolinguistic variation and rely 
instead on a literal, ‘legalistic’ approach to interpretation of meaning. Thus an African American 
minister who said in a sermon ‘we will kill Richard Nixon’ found himself charged with threatening the 
President (Solan & Tiersma 2005: 207), and in 2012 an English tourist who, eagerly looking forward 
to an upcoming holiday, commented on Twitter that he was going to ‘destroy America’, was refused 
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entry to the US7. Although such cases seem to fly in the face of common sense, let alone linguistic 
research, their existence points to a genuine conflict.  
The legal system necessarily requires certainty in enforcing the line between criminal acts and non-
actionable behaviour; it also has a tendency to decontextualise and examine evidence as if it existed 
independently from the context which gave rise to it. It is also used to applying principles of 
interpretation to legal texts which do rely on literal statement as the norm. But legal language is an 
atypical genre, as we have already seen. And ‘ordinary’ language cannot be packaged up and re-
presented in a courtroom as an isolated, context-free artefact for detached scrutiny, in the way that 
other forensic evidence can be. The processes through which humans derive meaning from language 
are far more complex and elusive than the linear, detached logic the legal system often seems to 
expect. The role that linguists can play in such cases, then, is in ensuring that when courts are faced 
with the challenge of interpreting meaning, they do so by applying the principles derived from 
linguistic research into everyday communication, rather than using literalistic methods which may 
feel more in keeping with legal principle.  
Trademarks 
Trademarks are another area of law where linguists have frequently been called on to provide 
evidence, especially in the US. It is an obvious area of linguistic and legal interrelation: as Butters 
states, ‘[t]rademarks ... are proprietary language – bits of linguistic or semiotic material that people, 
corporations, and institutions in a very real but limited sense own’ (2010: 352). The extent to which 
a person, or corporation, should be able to claim ownership over any part of our shared language is 
a thorny question, but equally it is a commercial necessity that providers of products or services can 
distinguish themselves through the use of marks or brands, and that any investment in that mark (in 
the form of time, money and marketing, for example) is protected – as far as legally appropriate. 
Disputes arise when one party considers that their trademark ownership is being infringed by 
another party who is attempting to use a mark which is too similar to their own. The response from 
the other party may be to argue that the marks are not sufficiently similar to give rise to any 
confusion between them; an alternative rebuttal is that the claimed trademark is too weak to merit 
legal protection. Both of these are areas where linguists can contribute. 
With regard to similarity and confusion, the main areas in which linguists can assist are as to 
whether the marks sound the same, and whether they share meaning. As with other areas of 
forensic linguistics, these are aspects which a court may consider to be within their own 
understanding without the help of an expert, although the numerous cases in which linguists have 
successfully given evidence suggests otherwise (see e.g. Butters 2010; Shuy 2012). The type of 
analysis provided will depend on the case, but may draw on phonetics, lexicography, pragmatics, 
and psycholinguistics, to name but a few, in order to assist the court to reach a reasoned and logical 
decision which goes beyond mere impression. 
As to whether a particular mark is actually strong enough to merit protection, the law will not 
protect a mark which is merely generic or descriptive. For example, a court held that ‘steakburger’ 
could not be a trademark (see Butters 2010: 359-61). A real difficulty arises for companies who have 
been so successful that their brand name has become synonymous with the product or service in 
                                                          
7 ‘Caution on Twitter urged as tourists banned from US’, BBC News, 31 January 2012, available at: 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/technology-16810312 (last accessed 14/08/14) 
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general. In the UK, for example, only a minority of my students recognise ‘Hoover’ to be a company 
name and not simply the verb for using a vacuum cleaner, and their number dwindles every year. 
Dictionaries only provide part of the picture of everyday language use, and so linguists can usefully 
be called on to provide evidence of language shift and dilution such as this. In the US Roger Shuy 
gave evidence in a case where McDonald’s sought to prevent Quality Inns opening a chain of hotels 
called ‘McSleep Inns’. Essentially, McDonald’s wanted to claim the prefix ‘Mc-’ as their trademark, 
whereas Quality Inns’ case was that it had become generic. Shuy looked to actual language use, and 
produced a corpus including ‘McCinema’, ‘McBook’, and ‘McHospital’, finding that it had come to 
have a general meaning of ‘basic, convenient, inexpensive, and standardized’ (2012: 459). However, 
McDonald’s won the case: the judge found that the prefix had acquired ‘secondary meaning’ which 
had created such a strong association with this one company that consumers might assume that the 
hotels were part of the McDonald’s group.  
The outcome of this case may well make many linguists uncomfortable in that it purports to affect 
the ownership of language, but it must always be borne in mind that the courts in trademark cases, 
and all other cases involving language evidence, are not making judgements of linguistic issues, but 
legal ones. Linguistic evidence may play an important part in a case, but it must always sit alongside 
numerous other considerations. 
Conclusion 
Overall, then, there are many areas of common interest between law and linguistics, and this 
chapter has inevitably not covered all of them. There is also an obvious tension: law is about justice, 
and yet the legal system’s use and interpretation of language has frequently been demonstrated by 
linguists to lead to the perpetuation – indeed creation – of injustice. It seems that this is often due to 
misunderstanding or ignorance of the principles of language and communication, rather than any 
deliberate intention. The onus is therefore on linguists to challenge those misunderstandings, to 
make the case for our involvement, and to demonstrate the need to bring our research into practice. 
Much of the work mentioned in this chapter is already making that contribution, but it is only a 
starting point. Hopefully this chapter will serve to encourage others to continue this aim. 
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